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I. INTRODUCTION

When the colonies attained their political independence from Europe, they
also acquired a problematic relationship with the indigenous peoples who already
inhabited the "new" continent. Due to Britain's practice of seeking tribal consent
to settle lands, underlying questions about the tribes' and tribal members' rights
vis-k-vis settlers lay dormant during the period of Britain's rule.1 Since the United
States' formation, however, tribal and Anglo-American interests often have conflicted.' As a result, the Supreme Court repeatedly has adjudicated the tribes' and
the United States' respective rights as sovereigns. 3
The Court's jurisprudence in deciding these disputes is best understood
as two separate periods: 1823-1977, and 1978 to present. In both, the Court
developed doctrines to vindicate the United States' interests at the expense of
tribal sovereignty, but there are important distinctions between them. During the
first period, the doctrines the Court developed constrained sovereignty when its
exercise expressly conflicted with the interests of the United States.4 In the second
period, the Court extended its inquiry and began to divest tribes of sovereignty
when it considered that sovereignty implicitly incongruent with the United States'
interests-even when allowing tribal sovereignty would not create an express
conflict between the two sovereigns.'
This Article explores the limits that the Court historically has imposed upon
tribal sovereignty and the questions raised by the Court's most recent doctrine:
the doctrine of implicit divestiture. Part II reviews the two doctrines the Court
developed during the first period of its Indian law jurisprudence: the doctrine of

ISee DAVID H.
ed. 2005).

GETCHES ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAw

2 See generally GETCHES ET AL., supra note

55 (5th

1. Getches' casebook gives concise synopses of

the United States' Indian Law jurisprudence and current conflicts within federal Indian
Law.

3 See, e.g., Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823) (concerning effects of
discovery upon tribal sovereign rights); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903)
(holding that Congress has plenary power over Indian tribes); Oliphant v. Suquamish
Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978) (stating that Indian tribes are impliedly divested of
sovereign authority where exercise of power is inconsistent with the tribes' status).
4See Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 565-66 (holding that Congress has plenary power over "tribal
relations," and explaining that this legislative power allows Congress to pass laws in conflict with treaty provisions); Johnson, 21 U.S. at 573 (holding that discovery necessarily
diminished tribes' rights to alienate land).
IOliphant,435 U.S. at 208-09 ("[T]he tribes' retained powers are not such that they are
limited only by specific restrictions in treaties or congressional enactments. .

.

. Upon

incorporation into the territory of the United States, the Indian tribes thereby come under
the territorial sovereignty of the United States and their exercise of separate power is
constrained so as not to conflict with the interests of this overriding sovereignty.").
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol7/iss1/5
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discovery and the doctrine of plenary power. Part III introduces the second period's
doctrine of implicit divestiture, and discusses a potential limit on that doctrine:
the "congressional delegation exception," the use of which the Court recently held
removed a constraint on tribal jurisdiction that the Court had imposed under the
implicit divestiture doctrine. Part IV reviews commentators' thoughts about how
the exception might be used to fortify tribal sovereignty, and considers potential
problems in applying the exception. It argues that, at present, the implicit divestiture doctrine lacks a coherent rationale; that this makes the doctrine unmoored
and malleable; and that its malleability potentially poses enormous threats to
exercises of tribal sovereignty-even those expressly sanctioned by Congress.
II. 1823-1977: THE DOCTRINES OF DISCOVERY AND PLENARY POWER
The Supreme Court considered the nature of tribal authority beginning in
the nineteenth century, as interactions between non-Indians and tribes generated
litigation. 6 To resolve these disputes, the Court developed two doctrines: the doctrine of discovery and the doctrine of plenary power. The effect of these doctrines
was to vindicate the United States' interests at the expense of tribal sovereignty.
A. Johnson v. M'Intosh: The Doctrine of Discovery and the United States
as Successor in Interest
In Johnson v. MIntosh,7 the Court considered the effect of Europe's discovery
of the New World upon tribal sovereignty. The case involved competing claims
to land originally inhabited by the Illinois and Piankeshaw Indians which had
been under Britain's control. Prior to the American Revolution, the Tribes' chiefs
sold the lands to various non-Indian individuals. 8 Virginia assumed control of the
territory during the Revolution and later ceded its rights to the United States; the
United States, in turn, eventually sold the tracts to McIntosh.9 After McIntosh
took possession of the land, the parties that had purchased it from the Tribes sued
McIntosh, arguing they had superior title. 10
The Court reviewed the history of North America's colonization" and concluded that the European "discovery" of the continent necessarily divested Indian
nations of complete sovereignty. 2 The Court based its holding on the "doctrine of

6 See, e.g., Johnson, 21 U.S. 543.
7Id.
8 Id. at

550-54 (Illinois Indians); see also id. at 555-58 (Piankeshaw Indians).

9Id. at 558-60.

,o
See id.at 560-62. Plaintiffs also included successors in interest to the parties that had
purchased the lands. Id. at 560-61.
" Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 574-87 (1823).
12Id. at 574.
Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2007
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discovery" developed by colonizing European governments.13 This doctrine, the
Court explained, grew out of a mutual need:
On the discovery of this immense continent, the great nations of
Europe were eager to appropriate to themselves so much of it as
they could respectively acquire .... [A]s they were all in pursuit
of nearly the same object, it was necessary, in order to avoid
conflicting settlements, and consequent war with each other, to
establish a principle, which all should acknowledge as the law by
which the right of acquisition, which they all asserted, should be
14
regulated as between themselves.
Thus, as the various European nations rushed to stake claims on the "new"
continent, it became to the advantage of each to establish rules by which its
claims would be respected by the others. These interests converged to establish
the doctrine of discovery by which each European nation vindicated its claims in
exchange for recognizing the claims of its colonial competitors.
According to the Court, the doctrine's "original fundamental principle" was
15
that discovery gave the discoverer the sole right to title over the discovered land.
This title, the Court found, was "consummated" by possessing the land.' 6 Until
possession, discovery prevented other European governments from establishing
any claim to the land, including claims based on negotiations with the tribes that
occupied it.' 7
The Court next considered the effect of the doctrine upon the rights of North
America's indigenous inhabitants:
The exclusion of all other Europeans, necessarily gave to the
nation making the discovery the sole right of acquiring the soil
from the natives, and establishing settlements upon it. It was a
right with which no Europeans could interfere. It was a right
which all asserted for themselves, and to the assertion of which,
by others, all assented.
13See id. 572-74 (discussing discoverers' rights as recognized by European colonizing governments); see also id. at 587 (stating that the United States has "unequivocally acceded" to
doctrine that discovery granted discoverer rights). For a comprehensive discussion of the
doctrine of discovery, see generally ROBERT J. MILLER, NATIVE AMERICA, DISCOVERED AND
CONQUERED: THOMAS

JEFFERSON,

LEWIS & CLARK, AND

MANIFEST DESTINY

(2006).

4

Johnson, 21 U.S. at 572-73.
15Id. at 574 ("original fundamental principle"); see also id. at 573 (" [D] iscovery gave title
to the government by whose subjects, or by whose authority, it was made, as against all
other European governments, which title might be consummated by possession.").
16Id. at 573.
17See id.
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol7/iss1/5
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Those relations which were to exist between the discoverer
and the natives, were to be regulated by themselves. The rights
thus acquired being exclusive, no other power could interpose
between them.
In the establishment of these relations, the rights of the original inhabitants were . . . necessarily, to a considerable extent,
impaired. They were admitted to be the rightful occupants of
the soil, with a legal as well as a just claim to retain possession
of it... but their rights to complete sovereignty, as independent
nations, were necessarily diminished, and their power to dispose
of the soil at their own will, to whomsoever they pleased, was
denied by the original fundamental principle, that discovery
gave exclusive title to those who made it.'
Here, the Court held the event of discovery divested tribes of the sovereign
power to convey their lands freely.' 9 Although tribes might (and often did) remain
in possession of the land, the doctrine of discovery granted the discoverer the right
to obtain land from a tribe.2" In addition, it divested the tribes of their "rights to
complete sovereignty, as independent nations," and granted the discoverer power,
with the tribes, to "regulate" the relations which were to exist between them. The
rights and powers granted by discovery were exclusive: no one but that land's
discoverer held them.
Finally, the Court concluded that Britain's treaty with the United States at
the close of the American Revolution, in which Britain ceded its territorial rights,
conveyed Britain's rights and powers of discovery upon the American States. 2' The
States subsequently ceded their rights to the United States.12 Thus, the rights and
23
powers of discovery eventually vested in the federal government.
As applied to McIntosh, the finding that discovery divested tribes of the
power to convey their land to anyone except their discoverer meant that the Tribes
lacked the ability to sell legal title to the plaintiffs, and that McIntosh's title was

Id. at 573-74.
Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 573-74 (1823).
20 Indeed, the Court went on to say that the doctrine gave the discoverer not only the
exclusive right to acquire land occupied by Indians, but also the power to grant title to
others while the
tribes were in possession of the land. Id. at 574.
4
'8

19

21

22

23

See id. at 58 -85.
Id. at 586.

See also id. at 587 (stating United States "unequivocally acceded" to doctrine of

discovery).
Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2007
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superior.2 4 More broadly speaking,Johnson stands for the principle that discovery
divested tribes of their authority as sovereigns to have government-to-government
relations with anyone but their discoverer (or its successor in interest).2 5 External
government-to-government relations between occupying tribes and another
European country, the Court said, "would have been considered and treated as an
invasion of the [discoverer's or its successor's] territories."26
The constraints upon tribal sovereignty imposed by discovery did not mean
that tribes no longer functioned as governments. Interestingly, the Court in
Johnson recognized that tribes had authority to govern the sale of the rights they
retained:
If an individual might.., purchase [Indian title], still he could
acquire . . . that title. Admitting [the tribes'] power to change

their laws or usages, so far as to allow an individual to separate
a portion of their lands from the common stock, and hold it in
severalty, still it is a part of their territory, and is held under them,
by a title dependent on their laws. The grant derives its efficacy
from [that tribe's] will; and, if [that tribe] choose[s] to resume it,
and make a different disposition of the land, the Courts of the
United States cannot interpose for the protection of the title.
The person who purchases lands from the Indians, within their
territory, incorporates himself with them, so far as respects the

24 See id. at 595 ("If... discovery be made ...under the authority of an existing govern-

ment ...the country becomes a part of the [discovering] nation, and ...the vacant soil
is . . .disposed of [according to the discoverer's laws].").
25 See Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 573-74 (1823) (holding that discovery gave the discovering nation "exclusive" right, along with the land's tribal occupants,
to regulate the relations between them, and finding that, upon discovery, the tribes'

rights to "complete sovereignty, as independent nations, were necessarily diminished").
Traditionally, the Court cites Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831), for
this proposition. E.g., Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 209 (1978)

(citing Cherokee, 30 U.S. at 17-18). However, the statements in Cherokee that are cited for
this principle merely echo those that appeared previously in Johnson. Compare Cherokee,
30 U.S. at 17-18 ("[Indian tribes] and their country are considered by foreign nations, as
well as by ourselves, as being so completely under the sovereignty and dominion of the
United States, that any attempt to acquire their lands, or to form a political connection

with them, would be considered by all as an invasion of our territory, and an act of hostility."), with Johnson, 21 U.S. at 573-74, 583-84 (stating that after Britain ceded territory
west of the Mississippi to France "any [later] attempt to purchase it from the Indians,
would have been considered and treated as an invasion of the territories of France"); Id. at

587 (stating that after the United States purchased Louisiana from France, "any attempt
of others to intrude into that country .

. .

would be considered as an aggression which

would justify war").
26

Johnson, 21 U.S. at 583-84.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol7/iss1/5
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property purchased; holds their title under their protection, and
27
subject to their laws.
Here, the Court's comments indicate that those powers retained by tribes
after discovery remain subject to tribal authority.28 Post-discovery, tribes retained
the right of occupancy and were able to convey it to another party, even a nonIndian; these conveyed rights, however, depended upon that tribe (rather than
upon the United States) for recognition and enforcement. 29 Thus, the Johnson
plaintiffs' remedies, if available, were only available under tribal law.

B. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock: The Advent of CongressionalPlenaryPower
In Lone Wolfv. Hitchcock,3 ° one of the most sweeping decisions in its history,
the Court addressed the question of the bounds of tribal authority vis-ii-vis the
United States. Lone Wolf and its premise-that Congress had "plenary" power
over Indian tribes-became the basis and justification for subsequent incursions
upon tribal authority.3"
Lone Wolf contested Congress' authority to unilaterally change agreements made by tribes and officers of the federal government.12 The Kiowa and
Comanche Tribes' 1867 treaty with the United States provided specifically that
cessions of reservation lands required the consent of three-fourths of the adult
male Indians on the reservation. 33 In 1892, the Tribes signed an agreement to
cede lands held in common by them to the United States; the United States was
to allot lands to individual tribal members and purchase "surplus" lands for later
sale to non-Indians.3 4 Subsequently, Congress acted to effectuate the agreement

27
28

Id. at 593.
Id.

In the instant case, the Court determined that, since the plaintiffs' beneficial title
depended on the Tribes' recognition, Johnson et. al lost the right of occupancy they had
purchased from the Tribes when the Tribes ceded their lands to the United States without
recognizing plaintiffs' titles within the terms of the cession: "[The Tribes'] cession of the
country, without a reservation of this land, affords a fair presumption, that they considered
[the conveyance to plaintiffs] as of no validity. They ceded to the United States this very
property, after having used it in common with other lands, as their own, from the date of
their deeds to the time of cession[.]" Id. at 594.
30 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
3" See CONFERENCE OF W. ATTORNEYS GEN., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW DESKBOOK 107-08
(Joseph P. Mazurek et al. eds., 2d ed. 1998) (listing various statutes enacted under
Congress' plenary power to govern Indian country).
32 Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 555, 564 (1903).
33
Id. at 554.
31 Id. at 554-55.
29

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2007

7

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 7 [2007], No. 1, Art. 5
WYOMING LAW REVIEW

Vol. 7

by congressional acts.35 These acts, however, modified the agreement in various
36
particulars.
The Tribes sued, arguing that the acts violated their property rights without
due process and were unconstitutional. 3 7 The Tribes had three arguments against
the law, two of which touched upon the federal government's authority to take
unilateral action affecting the Tribes. First, the Tribes argued that the agreement
they had signed (and the acts implementing it) was invalid because it had not been
consented to by three-fourths of the Tribes' adult male population, as required by
treaty.38 Second, the Tribes argued the acts were invalid because they unilaterally
changed the terms of the signed agreement "without submitting such changes to
39
the Indians for their consideration."
In a short opinion, the Court affirmed lower court decisions that sustained
the United States' motion to dismiss. 40 The Court explained that Congress had
complete power over tribes:
Indians who [are not] fully emancipated from the control and
protection of the United States are subject, at least so far as the
tribal lands [are] concerned, to be controlled by direct legislation
of Congress .... Plenary authority over the tribal relations of the
Indians has been exercised by Congress from the beginning, and
the power has always been deemed a political one, not subject
to be controlled by the judicial department of the government.

Id. at 559-60 (Senate bill, amended and passed by House of Representatives and subsequently enacted as amended); see also id. at 560 (subsequent acts passed to implement
non-Indian settlement).
36 As finally passed, the adopted bill: changed the time frame for making allotments;
amended requirements regarding the composition of Indian allotments (between agricultural and grazing land); set aside an amount of grazing land to be used in common by
the Tribes; eliminated provisions which treated the Indian agent and army officer who
negotiated the agreement for the U.S. as members of the Tribes (thus entitling them to
benefits under the agreement); exempted monies from the surplus land sale from Indian
depredation claims; and provided that surplus land proceeds would be subject to further
congressional action in the event that a claim then pending against the Tribes (by other
tribes) was successful. See id. at 556-60.
17 Id. at 561.
38 Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 556 (1903). This contention was confirmed by
the Secretary of the Interior. The Secretary lacked census records for the year the agreement was made, and so based his calculation upon member rolls used to make payments
to tribal members. Id. at 557.
39 Id. at 561. The Tribes also argued that the agreement was invalid because the interpreters had misrepresented its terms to the Tribes. Id.
15

40

Id. at 568.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol7/iss1/5
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• . . [A]s with treaties made with foreign nations, the legislative
power might pass laws in conflict with treaties made with the
Indians. 4
In Johnson, the Court found that discovery granted the discoverer the exclusive right to "regulate" its relationship to the tribes within its territory.42 Lone Wolf
further elucidated the United States/tribal relationship, characterizing it as one in
which Congress had absolute, unilateral power over tribes.43
By characterizing Congress' power as plenary, the Court implied that, while
the United States' relationship with tribes developed through mutual negotiation, these negotiations were merely an exercise of Congress' absolute power over
tribes.44 Essentially, the Court's rationale was that the greater power (plenary
power) included the lesser (the power to negotiate). 45 Thus, under Lone Wolf, the
United States would have been within its rights had it chosen never to negotiate
46
with the tribes but unilaterally to impose its will upon them from the start.
C. Analysis of Early DoctrinesRegarding Tribal Sovereignty
The doctrines of discovery and plenary power can be criticized easily on the
grounds that they legitimize colonialism at the expense of indigenous rights. In
both Johnson and Lone Wolf, the Court sidestepped the inherent inequities caused
by the United States' actions and avoided discussion of the self-interest that
motivated them. Though the Court's opinion in Johnson contains expressions of
regret, 47 these comments are unpersuasive in the face of the Court's vindication of
the doctrine of discovery. 48 The Lone WolfCourt's assertion that it "must presume
41 Id. at 567, 565-66 (citation omitted).
42

Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 573 (1823).

" See Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 567.
44 See id. at 564 ("The contention [that the agreement was void because it violated the
terms of the Tribes' treaty with the United States] in effect ignores the status of the contracting Indians and the relation of dependency they bore and continue to bear towards
the United States. To uphold the claim would be to adjudge that the indirect operation
of the treaty was to materially limit and qualify the controlling authority of Congress in
respect to the care and protection of the Indians, and to deprive Congress, in a possible
emergency, when the necessity might be urgent . . of all power to act, if the assent of the
Indians could not be obtained.").
4' See id.
46 See id.
47
Johnson, 21 U.S. at 588 ("Conquest gives a title which the Courts of the conqueror cannot deny, whatever the private and speculative opinions of individuals may be, respecting
the original justice of the claim which has been successfully asserted.").
48 Id. at 588, 591 ("However extravagant the pretension of converting the discovery of an
inhabited country into conquest may appear; if the principle has been asserted in the first
instance, and afterwards sustained; if a country has been acquired and held under it; if the
Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2007
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that Congress acted in perfect good faith" in exercising its plenary power, and its
suggestion that the Tribes instead petition Congress for relief, are of little comfort
given its conclusion that any congressional act regarding Indians is nonjusticiable.49 Moreover, Lone Wolfs premise that the United States held more power
than it exercised 5" also figures as an unwelcome harbinger of-and invitation
for-later impositions upon the tribes.
Nonetheless, unjust though they may be, these early doctrines at least have
the virtue of restraint. The consequences of discovery appear to be limited to the
loss of legal title and the right to have a government-to-government relationship
with any nation other than the United States; limitations on tribal sovereignty
under the plenary power doctrine require express congressional action adverse
to tribal sovereignty.5 Ultimately, many tribes weathered discovery and various
congressional acts (some intended to destroy them) and survived as political
5 2
entities.
III. 1978-PRESENT: THE RISE OF JUDICIAL CONSTRAINTS
ON TRIBAL SOVREIGNTY

By contrast, the future of tribal sovereignty during the second, current period
of jurisprudence is far from certain. In this period, the Court created and continues to develop the doctrine of implicit divestiture. Under this doctrine, the Court
invalidates exercises of tribal sovereignty that it finds to be "inconsistent" with the
tribes' dependent status. 3 Unlike the doctrine of plenary power, implicit divesti54
ture does not require express congressional action inimical to tribal sovereignty.

property of the great mass of the community originates in it, it becomes the law of the
land, and cannot be questioned.").
"' Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 567-68 (1903).
5 See supra text accompanying notes 41-42.
"' See Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 567 (characterizing Congress' plenary power as "legislative")
(quoting Choctaw Nation v. United States, 119 U.S. 1 (1886), for the proposition that
"Indians who [are] not ...fully emancipated from the control and protection of the
United States are subject ... to be controlled by direct legislation of Congress.").
52 For an excellent overview of the history of congressional Indian policy, see generally
GETCHES ET AL., supra note 1, at 140-256. The United States has pursued various measures
to destroy tribalism. Id.Generally, early approaches attempted to achieve this goal by
making traditional tribal lifestyles impossible; the Anglo-American lifestyle, meanwhile,
was promoted aggressively. Id. at 141-47, 165-84. From 1945-1961, the United States
even attempted to assimilate tribal members by "terminating" tribes--ending their legal
existences. Id. at 199-207.
5 See, e.g., Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 208 (1978).
" Id. ("[Tihe tribes' retained powers are not such that they are limited only by specific
restrictions in treaties or congressional enactments .... Indian tribes are prohibited from
exercising both those powers of autonomous states that are expressly terminated by
Congress and those powers "inconsistent with their status." (citation omitted)).
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol7/iss1/5
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Under implicit divestiture, the Court scrutinizes the contested tribal act, and then
itse/f decides whether the act was "inconsistent" with the tribe's status.55 If the
56
Court finds the tribe's act to be "inconsistent," it holds the act invalid.
Thus, through its implicit divestiture doctrine, the Court has interjected
itself alongside Congress as a power able to curtail tribal sovereignty. Invalidations
under implicit divestiture do not merely enforce limits expressly imposed upon
the tribes by Congress; rather, the Court creates limits independently based upon
determinations of the act's "consistency" with the tribes' status.57 The standard for
the doctrine's application is vague, with the result that it is difficult to determine
the doctrine's reach. Moreover, judicially-imposed constraints may prove intractable: at present, it is unclear whether Congress can use its plenary power to check
58
all constraints on tribal sovereignty imposed under the doctrine.

A. Oliphant and Its Progeny: Implied Divestitureof Tribal Sovereignty
Beginning in 1978 with Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,59 the Supreme
Court decided a series of cases which dramatically curtailed the sovereignty tribes
retained under previous jurisprudence. 60 Specifically, the Court in Oliphant
created a new doctrine by which to evaluate the validity of assertions of tribal
authority: the doctrine of implicit divestiture.61
At issue in Oliphantwas whether a tribe retained inherent, sovereign power to
assert criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians for their acts on the tribe's reservation. 62 Petitioners Mark David Oliphant and Daniel B. Belgarde were non-Indian
residents of the Suquamish Indian Tribe's Port Madison Reservation. 63 The Tribe

55 See, e.g., Oliphant,435 U.S. 191 (1978).
56

See, e.g., id.

" See, e.g., id.
58 See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004) (holding that Congress could use its
plenary power to permit tribes, as an exercise of their inherent sovereign authority, to
criminally prosecute nonmember Indians, but intimating that Congress' implementing
statute may be subject to constitutional challenge).
59 Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
60 See, e.g., Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981) (ruling that tribes generally
divested of legislative jurisdiction over "nonmembers of the tribe," with exceptions); Strate
v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997) (ruling that tribal courts' adjudicative jurisdictions are coextensive with tribes' legislative jurisdictions; assertions of tribal adjudicative
jurisdiction are judged under Montana); see, e.g., Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544
(1981) (holding that tribes generally divested of legislative jurisdiction over "nonmembers
of the tribe," with exceptions).
61 Oliphant,435 U.S. 191.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 194.
Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2007
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had adopted a Law and Order Code addressing a variety of offenses that pur64
ported to extend the Tribe's jurisdiction over both Indians and non-Indians.
Oliphant and Belgarde were charged by the Tribe under the Code. In habeas
corpus petitions to the United States District Court, each argued that the Tribe's
purported criminal jurisdiction was invalid as applied to non-Indians. 65 The Tribe
argued that it had criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians as a result of its "retained
66
inherent powers of government over the Port Madison Indian Reservation.
In assessing the Tribe's claim of retained authority, the Court boldly pronounced that tribes' sovereign powers could be reduced even when the federal
government had not acted expressly to delimit them: "[T]he tribes' retained
powers are not such that they are limited only by specific restrictions in treaties
or congressional enactments. ''67 Instead, the Court announced a new rule for
determining when a tribe had been divested of sovereign power, which applied
even absent express federal action limiting tribal authority: "Indian tribes are prohibited from exercising both those powers of autonomous states that are expressly
terminated by Congress and those powers 'inconsistent with their status.' 68 This
holding is the central pillar of the doctrine of implicit divestiture. The doctrine is
one of divestiture because, through its application, Indian tribes are held to have
been divested of specific sovereign powers; it is implicit because the divestiture
is not the result of an express executive or legislative action. Under the doctrine,
tribal exercises of authority found to be inconsistent with the tribes' status are null
and void. The doctrine of implicit divestiture thus has become a powerful vehicle
69
for challenging tribal actions.
In applying this new doctrine, the Oliphant Court ultimately determined
that tribal assertions of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians were inconsistent
with their status and thus void. 7' To reach this decision, the Court considered
' Id. at 193. The Tribe also had gone to great lengths to publicize its jurisdiction over all
entrants to the Reservation: "[n]otices were placed in prominent places at the entrance to
the Port Madison Reservation informing the public that entry onto the Reservation would
be deemed implied consent to the criminal jurisdiction of the Suquamish tribal court."
Id. at 193 n.2.
65 Id. at 194-95.
66
Id. at 195-96.
67 Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 208 (1978).
68 Id. (citing and quoting Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 E2d 1007, 1009 (9th Cir. 1976)).
69 See Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S.
408 (1989) (holding that the tribe is divested of power to impose zoning regulations on
reservation lands within open area of reservation and owned by nonmembers); see, e.g.,
Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981) (holding that the tribe is divested of
power to regulate hunting and fishing by non-Indians on reservation lands held in fee
by nonmembers of the tribe); Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima
Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989) (tribe divested of power to impose zoning regulations
on reservation lands within open area of reservation and owned by nonmembers).
70 Oliphant,435 U.S. at 210.
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both the history of tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians and the federal
government's interest in protecting United States citizens from tribal prosecution.
After reviewing the history of tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians, the Court concluded that Congress, the Executive Branch, and lower federal courts each held
a "commonly shared presumption" that tribes lacked criminal jurisdiction over
non-Indians. 7' In addition, the Court was concerned that allowing tribal jurisdiction would infringe upon important rights incident to United States citizenship."
The Court noted that "from the formation of the Union and the adoption of
the Bill of Rights, the United States has manifested [a] . . . solicitude that its
citizens be protected by the United States from unwarranted intrusions on their
personal liberty. '73 It reviewed a prior case7 1 in which it had held the United States
lacked federal criminal jurisdiction over tribal members on the basis that allowing
federal jurisdiction would subject tribal members to trial under an "external and
unknown code . .. by a standard made for others and not for them . . . accord75
ing to the law of a social state of which they have an imperfect conception."
Allowing tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians, the Court continued, would cause
the same problem in reverse: United States citizens would be subjected to a similarly "external code. '76 The federal interests in protecting United States citizens

71

Id. at 206. The Court's historical review acknowledged that the United States Reports

did not specifically discuss the question of tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians, but concluded that this omission was because historically the issue was moot: most tribes did
not have a formal court system and so did not assert jurisdiction over non-Indians. Id.
at 197. The Court then reviewed treaties between the United States and various tribes,
and decided that the treaties showed that both the federal government and the tribes
presumed that tribes would lack jurisdiction over non-Indians absent a "congressional
statute or treaty provision to that effect." Id.; treaty provisions reviewed id. The Court also
considered opinions by the Attorneys General, written in the 1800's, that argued tribal
jurisdiction over non-Indians was inconsistent with treaty provisions that recognized the
United States' sovereignty over Indian Country and the Indians' dependence upon the
United States. Id. at 199. The Court noted that one federal court decision considering
the issue had concluded that tribal courts lacked jurisdiction to try non-Indians. Id. The
Court also reviewed legislative history regarding the issues of tribal criminal jurisdiction
over non-Indians in a proposed Indian Territory, federal criminal jurisdiction over Indians,
and federal legislation preventing trespass on Indian lands, and concluded that Congress'
discussions and acts evinced its understanding that tribes did not retain jurisdiction over
non-Indians. Id. at 201-03, 204-05. Finally, the Court noted that one of its 1891 opinions
recognized that congressional acts "demonstrated an intent to reserve jurisdiction over
non-Indians for the federal courts." Id. at 204.
72 See id. at 210.
73 Id.
" Exparte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
71 Oliphant,435 U.S. at 210-11 (quoting Exparte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 571).
76
1 d. at 211.
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from unwarranted intrusions upon their personal liberties and from exposure to
alien tribal court systems, said the Court, also led it to conclude that tribes lacked
77
inherent jurisdiction to try non-Indians.
Subsequent decisions have built upon Oliphant and developed further
guidelines for assessing whether the Court will find that a tribe's authority was
"inconsistent with [its] status" and therefore implicitly divested. 78 Generally,
the Court has found the tribes to be divested of jurisdiction over anyone except
their respective members. 79 This principle applies to both criminal and civil
jurisdiction.80
The Court has carved out certain exceptions to this "members-only" limitation in the context of civil jurisdiction; these were set out in Montana v. United
States,8' the current lodestar regarding tribal civil jurisdiction. First, a tribe may
regulate "the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with
the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other
arrangements."82 Second, as to fee lands within a tribe's reservation boundaries,
the tribe may regulate the "conduct of non-Indians [only] when that conduct
threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security,
83
or the health and welfare of the tribe."
84
A later case, Strate v. A-] Contractors,
demonstrated that the Court construes
Montana's exceptions very narrowly. The Strate Court rejected tribal jurisdiction in a civil suit between two non-Indians arising from an auto accident that
occurred on land held in trust for the tribes and maintained as a highway by
North Dakota.85 Strate's discussion of the first Montana exception clarified that

77

See id. at 212.
78 See, e.g., Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 546 (1981) (tribes generally divested
of legislative jurisdiction over "nonmembers of the tribe," with exceptions); Strate v. A-I
Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997) (stating that the tribal courts' adjudicative jurisdictions are coextensive with tribes' legislative jurisdictions; assertions of tribal adjudicative
jurisdiction are judged under Montana).
79See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326 (1978) ("The areas in which such
implicit divestiture of sovereignty has been held to have occurred are those involving the
relations between an Indian tribe and nonmembers of the tribe.") (holding that an Indian
tribe has criminal jurisdiction over tribal member for crime committed on tribe's reservation on basis that it was an exercise of tribe's retained right to internal self-government).
80 See Montana,450 U.S. at 565. Montana rejected the Crow Tribe's authority to regulate
non-Indian fishing and hunting on reservation lands held in fee by nonmembers. Id.at
544.
81

Id.

821d.at 56 5.
83
Id.at 566.
84 Strate v. A-I Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997).
85

Id.
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the mere existence of a "consensual relationship" between a party and the tribe
was insufficient to sustain that tribe's claim of jurisdiction.16 The Strate Court
construed Montana's second exception equally narrowly: while it conceded that
careless driving "endanger[s] all in the vicinity, and surely jeopardize[s] the safety
of tribal members[,] "the Court declined to find that this activity rose to the level
required for the tribe to have jurisdiction under Montana's second exception.87 In
rejecting the argument in favor of tribal jurisdiction, the Court commented, "if
Montana'ssecond exception requires no more, the exception would severely shrink
the rule."88 Instead, the Court framed its discussion of the exception as focusing
on whether allowing state jurisdiction would "trench unduly on tribal self-government," 89 and characterized the tribes' rights to self-government as limited to "'the
right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them."' 90
Thus, after Strate, Montana's exceptions seem out of reach for all but the most
dramatic scenarios under which a tribe would attempt to assert jurisdiction.
As apparent by this attempt to sketch the contours of law regarding implicit
divestiture of tribal authority over nonmembers, 9 Oliphants implicit divestiture
doctrine has resulted in a judicially-devised system for assessing assertions of tribal
authority that is tangled and unpredictable. As jurisprudence now stands, various
factors may influence whether a tribe can assert jurisdiction: what jurisdiction the
tribe is asserting (i.e., criminal or civil); 92 over whom the tribe asserts jurisdiction

86 Id. at 456-57. Strate's defendants were working on the reservation under subcontract

with a tribal corporation (i.e., one wholly owned by the Tribe). Id. at 443. One source
summarizes Montana's first exception after Strate as "typically... aris[ing] in connection
with business dealings on reservations with tribes or their members where the right to
engage in the particular activity may be conditioned on compliance with tribal law."
CONFERENCE OF W ATTORNEYs GEN., supra note 31, at 120.
87 See Strate, 520 U.S. at 457-58.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90
Id. at 458 (quoting Williams v. Lee, 358 US 217, 220 (1959)).
9 This brief summary of the most salient decisions regarding implicit divestiture of tribal
authority over nonmembers presents a far-from-complete picture of the Court's jurisprudence in the general area of tribal authority. For a comprehensive overview of tribal
authority generally, see CONFERENCE OF W. ATTORNEYS GEN., supra note 31, at 109-21
(tribal civil jurisdiction); CONFERENCE OF W ATTORNEYS GEN., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW
DESKBOOK 45-53 (Joseph P. Mazurek et al. eds., 2d ed. Supp. 2002) (tribal civil jurisdiction); GETCHES ET AL., supra note 1, at 488-92 (criminal jurisdiction in Indian Country).
92 Tribes have criminal jurisdiction over members for crimes committed on the tribe's
reservation. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978). Tribes also have criminal
jurisdiction over nonmember Indians. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004).
Tribes have civil jurisdiction over members. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544,
565 (1981). Tribes also have civil jurisdiction over nonmembers under limited circumstances. See Montana, 450 U.S. at 565-67.
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(a tribal member, a nonmember Indian, or a nonmember non-Indian); 93 how
reservation lands are held (by the tribe, by the United States in trust for the tribe,
or in fee);94 the character of a nonmember's relationship to the tribe (consensual or
not); 95 and finally, the effect of a nonmember's activities upon the tribe (whether
or not they threaten or directly affect the tribe's political integrity, economic
security, health, or welfare). 96 The delineated factors help the Court to determine
whether a tribe's particular assertion of jurisdiction is "inconsistent with its status"
and thus implicitly divested. But the principles articulated in current case law are
not exhaustive: the Court could consider other factors, which then would serve as
springboards for further iterations of limits under implicit divestiture.
Speculating about applying implicit divestiture to possible assertions of tribal
authority illustrates the problems caused by the doctrine's vagaries. Significantly,
under Oliphant, the Court alone determines whether a tribe's authority to act
was implicitly divested. 97 Thus, Oliphant casts doubt upon all exercises of tribal
sovereignty, because any exercise which seems legitimate at its outset later may be
invalidated under implicit divestiture. Professor Philip Frickey rightly describes
this development as "a model of ad hoc common law-making" that "supplement[s]
the plenary power of Congress with [the Court's] own plenary common law
authority."98 After Oliphantand its progeny, tribes cannot be certain any assertion
of tribal jurisdiction will be upheld.

93E.g.,

Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (criminal jurisdiction over tribal members); Montana, 450

U.S. 544 (civil jurisdiction over nonmember non-Indians); Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (criminal
jurisdiction over nonmember Indians).
14 A tribe's civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on reservation lands held in fee is extremely
limited. See Montana, 450 U.S. at 565. But tribal jurisdiction over lands held in trust
for the tribe is not assured. See Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 456 (1997)
(tribe lacks jurisdiction over suit between nonmembers arising from accident on trust land
within reservation).
95A tribe may regulate "the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships
with the tribe or its members." Montana, 450 U.S. at 565. But the mere existence of some
consensual relationship to the tribe does not confer jurisdiction. See Strate, 520 U.S. at
456-57.
96

A tribe may regulate the activities of non-Indians on fee land within the reservation

when the non-Indian's conduct "threatens or has some ...

effect on the [tribe's] political

integrity, the economic security, or [its] health and welfare." Montana, 450 U.S. at 566.
But the Court construes this exception narrowly. See Strate, 520 U.S. at 457-59.
97See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 208-09 (1978) and discussion
infra Part IV.B.
98 Philip P. Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism in FederalIndian Law, 119 HAv.

L. REv. 431, 459 (2005). Frickey postulates that this approach grew out of the Court's

attempts to normalize law in Indian Country with Anglo-American jurisprudence. Id. He
argues that, rather than using implicit divestiture to standardize law in Indian country,

we should "hav[e] the courage to admit our larger confusions about the place of federal
Indian law in public law." Id. at 437.
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B. Reining in Implicit Divestiture: Duro, Lara, and the Congressional
Delegation Exception
As the Court developed the doctrine of implicit divestiture, it recognized one
exception to its general rule that divested tribes of authority the Court held to
be "inconsistent with their status." 99 This exception was most clearly expressed
in Montana v. United States: "Exercise of tribal power ...

inconsistent with the

dependent status of the tribes ... cannot survive without express congressionaldelegation.""' Express congressional delegation, then, potentially could allow a tribe
to exercise authority the Court otherwise would have found was divested."'0
For many years, this exception was purely theoretical: no congressional act
intervened to curtail implicit divestiture's continuing erosion of tribal authority.
In 1990, however, Congress amended the Indian Civil Rights Act of

19 6 8

°2 so as

1 °3

to conflict with the Court's holding in Duro v. Reina, decided earlier that same
year. Following a challenge involving the effect of the amended statute, the Court
was forced to consider the effects of the congressional delegation exception upon
its implicit divestiture doctrine."'
In Duro,a member of the Torres-Martinez Band of Cahuilla Mission Indians
was arrested for a crime committed on the Pima-Maricopa Tribe's reservation
and was prosecuted by the Tribe. 1°5 The defendant contested the Tribe's assertion of criminal jurisdiction over him.'0 6 The Court ruled for the defendant on
the basis that Indian tribes had been implicitly divested of criminal jurisdiction
over "nonmember Indians"-Indians not members of the specific tribe asserting
jurisdiction over them-for crimes committed on their reservations. 10 7The Court

Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 208 (1978) (quoting Oliphant v.
Schlie, 544 F.2d. 1007, 1009 (9th Cit. 1976)), superseded by statute, Indian Civil Rights
Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1301 (1979), as recognized in Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc. v. Doyle,
719 N.W2d 408 (Wis. 2006).
'0' Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 545-46 (1981) (emphasis added); see also
Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 208 (stating that tribes are implicitly divested of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians "absent affirmative delegation of such power by Congress").
101See, e.g., Montana, 450 U.S. at 564.
02
' Act of Nov. 5, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-511, 104 Stat 1856 § 8077 (codified as amended
"

at 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2006)).
103Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990) (holding that tribes were implicitly divested of
criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians), superseded by statute,Act of Nov. 5, 1990,
Pub. L. No. 101-511, 104 Stat 1856 § 8077, as recognized in Mousseaux v. U.S. Comm'r
of Indian Affairs, 806 F. Supp. 1433, 1439-1440 (D.S.D. 1992).
104 United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004).
105 Duro, 495 U.S. at 679-80.
106 Id. at 681-82.
107 Id. at 688.
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found that Congress had not considered tribal authority over nonmembers, and
concluded that tribes' retaining this authority would be inconsistent with their
dependent status.' 08
The Duro decision created an enormous problem respecting nonmember
Indians who committed crimes within Indian Country: after Duro, no government
had complete jurisdiction over these nonmembers." °9 To address the problems
created by Duro, Congress enacted the "Duro fix."" 0 This legislation amended the
relevant statute to statutorily recognize Indian tribes' "powers of self-government"
to include "exercis[ing] criminal jurisdiction over all Indians.."'. 1 Congress also
amended the statute specifically to recognize the tribes' power as an "inherent
power of Indian tribes, hereby recognized and affirmed."".2 The amendments'
express allocation arguably put tribal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians within
the implicit divestiture doctrine's "express congressional delegation" exception." 3
Moreover, by casting the tribes' criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers to be
an exercise of inherent tribal power, Congress clarified that it considered tribal
criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers to stem from retained tribal sovereignty
rather than from Congress delegating federal power to the tribes." 4
In United States v. Lara, 15 the Court considered the effect of the "Duro fix"
legislation upon tribal criminal jurisdiction. Lara involved a nonmember Indian
criminal defendant prosecuted for a crime committed on a tribe's reservation
under both tribal authority (under the Duro fix legislation) and federal authorSee id.at 690 ("[Congressional] statutes reflect at most the tendency of past Indian
policy to treat Indians as an undifferentiated class."); see also id. at 684-85 ("We think
108

the [implicit divestiture] rationale . . .compels the conclusion that Indian tribes lack

jurisdiction over persons who are not tribe members.").
109 Discussing the reason for this "prosecutorial void" is not necessary for the purposes of
this Article. Prior to Duro, it was clear that federal courts' jurisdiction over Indians was
sharply curtailed to jurisdiction for a small list of enumerated crimes. States usually did
not have jurisdiction over Indians for crimes committed on the reservation. Duro held that
tribes' criminal jurisdiction was limited to tribal members. Thus, after Duro, no authority had jurisdiction over many crimes committed by non-tribal-member Indians. This is
because both States and tribes lacked criminal jurisdiction altogether, and federal jurisdiction was limited to the enumerated crimes. For a good discussion of criminal jurisdiction
in Indian Country (written prior to the Court's Duro decision), see Chriss Wetherington,
CriminalJurisdictionof Tribal Courts Over Nonmember Indians: The Circuit Split, 1989
DuKE L.J. 1053 (1989) (arguing that tribal courts have jurisdiction over nonmembers).
"0CivI Rights Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-511, § 8077, 104 Stat. 1856
(1990) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2)); see also Pub. L. No. 102-137, 105
Stat. 646 (1991) (making change permanent).
...
Pub. L. No. 101-511, § 8077, 104 Stat. 1856.
112 Id.
113 See id.
114 See id.
115United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004).
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ity." 6 Billy Jo Lara, an Indian, married a member of the Spirit Lake Tribe and lived
on its reservation, but was not a member of the Tribe." 17 After "several instances of
serious misconduct," the Spirit Lake Tribe excluded him from its reservation."'
Lara disobeyed the order, and, when federal officials stopped him, Lara struck one
of them." 9 Based on Congress' statutory amendments granting tribes criminal
jurisdiction over all Indians (including nonmember Indians) for crimes committed on the reservation, the Tribe asserted jurisdiction over Lara and charged him
with "violence to a policeman.' 12 Lara pleaded guilty in Tribal Court and served
90 days in jail. 121Subsequently, the United States government prosecuted Lara for
22
the federal crime of assaulting a federal officer.1
The validity of the Tribe's prosecution under the "Duro fix" legislation was
not at issue in Lara; rather, the dispute was over its effect upon the United States'
efforts to prosecute under federal jurisdiction. 23 Lara claimed that tribal prosecutions under the "Duro fix" were made under federal authority that Congress had
delegated to the tribes. 2 4 He moved to dismiss the federal prosecution, arguing that because it also was made under federal authority, it violated the Fifth
Amendment's Double Jeopardy clause.125The Government argued that the "Duro
fix" did not delegate federal power to tribes but instead enlarged tribes' powers
of self-government. 2 6 The Government concluded by arguing that because the
Tribe's prosecution was made under its own sovereign authority, the "two prosecutions" were made by separate sovereigns, and subsequent federal prosecution did
27
not "violate the Double Jeopardy Clause." 1
The Court first decided that Congress had intended tribal sovereign power
(and not federal power) to underlie tribal prosecutions. 128 It reviewed the amendments' plain language and legislative history, and found these showed that

116

Id.

117Id. at

196.

118Id.
119
120

Id.
Id.

United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 196 (2004).
Id. at 197.
123 See id.However, Lara also made arguments based on the Due Process and Equal
Protection clauses, which tended to attack the legality of the Tribe's prosecution. See id.
at 208-09. The Court did not describe these arguments in detail but mentioned that, if
valid, they would show that Lara's tribal prosecution was constitutionally defective. Id.
The Court dismissed these arguments as "beside the point," noting that they would not
affect the Double Jeopardy claim at issue, and refused to address them. Id.
124 United States v. Lara, 294 E3d 1004, 1006 (8th Cit. 2002).
125See Lara, 541 U.S. at 197.
126Id. at 198.
121

122

127

Id.

128

Id. at 199.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2007

19

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 7 [2007], No. 1, Art. 5
WYOMING LAW REVIEW

Vol. 7

Congress had not intended merely to delegate federal authority to the tribes:
rather, Congress had intended that tribal prosecutions under the statute be made
under tribal sovereign authority.12 9
Next, the Court determined that Congress' plenary power over Indian tribes
under the Constitution allowed it to expand the tribes' sovereignty:
[T]he Constitution grants Congress broad general powers to
legislate in respect to Indian tribes, powers that we have consistently described as "plenary and exclusive." . .. Congress,
with this court's approval, has interpreted the Constitution's
"plenary" grants of power as authorizing it to enact legislation
that both restricts and, in turn, relaxes those restrictions on tribal
sovereign authority. From the Nation's beginning Congress' need
for such legislative power would have seemed obvious. After
all, the Government's Indian policies, applicable to numerous
tribes with diverse cultures, affecting billions of acres of land,
of necessity would fluctuate dramatically as the needs of the
Nation and those of the tribes changed over time. . . .Such
major policy changes inevitably involve major changes in the
1 30
metes and bounds of tribal sovereignty.
The Court's reasoning ratified Congress' authority to restore sovereignty to
the tribes under the plenary power doctrine."'3 Just as Congress can use plenary
power to restrict tribal sovereignty, it may use plenary power to expand it-as it
meant to do by enacting the "Duro fix.' 1 32 Seen in this light, the "congressional
delegation" exception is really a way of saying that Congress, by exercising its plenary power, can legislatively overrule the Court's finding of implicit divestiture.

IV. POST-LARA: Is

THE CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION EXCEPTION

"THE" ANSWER TO IMPLICIT DIVESTITURE?

A. An Overview ofLiterature Treating the CongressionalDelegation
Exception: OfPromiseand Problems
Though no new cases have reached the Court since Lara, commentators generally have accepted that Lara vindicates the congressional delegation exception
as an avenue to enlarge tribal authority, and they have cited express congressional
delegation as a means of resolving various problems that confront Indian Country.
Id. (citing the statute's language, committee reports, and statements made by various
members of Congress while Congress considered the amendments).
130 Id. at 200-02 (citations omitted).
131 United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200-02 (2004).
129

132

Id.
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For example, authors have suggested express congressional delegation could expand
tribal authority to tax,' 33 could allow tribes criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians
who committed crimes on the reservation,' 34 and could provide for inter-tribal
enforcement of each tribe's court orders. 13 One commentator reads Lara in conjunction with Maine's Indian Claims Settlement Act and Congress' Indian Claims
Settlement Act to propose that Maine tribes could force state courts to recognize
same-sex marriages acknowledged under tribal law.'36 While articles usually treat
the subject of tribal jurisdiction in the context of a specific issue, some authors
posit that Congress could use Lara to annul the Court's broadest incursions into
13 7
tribal authority: its holdings in Oliphantand Montana.
Notwithstanding the congressional delegation exception's availability in
theory, commentators have identified practical obstacles that may prevent using
Lara to further expand tribal jurisdiction. 38 Of these, the most commonly cited

See Anna-Marie Tabor, Sovereignty In the Balance: Taxation by Tribal Governments, 15
U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POLICY 349, 399 (2004) (citing Lara for proposition that "congressional action could ... expand the reach of tribal [tax] jurisdiction"); see also Matthew L.
M. Fletcher, In Pursuitof Tribal Economic Development as a Substitute for Reservation Tax
Revenue, 80 N.D. L. REv. 759, 800-03 (2004) (noting that Congress could extend tribal
authority to tax non-Indians).
134 See Amy Radon, Note, TribalJurisdictionand Domestic Violence: The Need for NonIndianAccountability on the Reservation, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1275, 1295, 1301-02
(2004) (noting that Congress should affirm tribal jurisdiction over non-Indian men
accused of committing domestic violence against Indian women).
135 Steven J. Gunn, Compacts, Confederacies, and Comity: IntertribalEnforcement of Tribal
Court Orders, 34 N.M. L. REv. 297, 322 (2004).
136 L. Scott Gould, December Song: The Waiting Game for Tribal Sovereignty in Maine,
20 ME. B.J. 18, 21-23 (2005). Maine's Indian Claims Settlement Act expressly stated
that Maine could not regulate "internal tribal matters," which the Act defined to include
"membership" and marriage between tribal members who reside on the reservation; the
federal Maine Indian Claims Settlement Act provided that the tribes and Maine would
give full faith and credit to each's respective judicial proceedings. Id. at 22-23. Gould
suggests the tribes could use their powers to define marriage to allow same-sex marriages
prohibited under Maine's laws; Maine would have to honor these marriages under the
federal Act's full faith and credit provisions. Id. at 23. He also posits that the tribes might
have jurisdiction over non-Indian same-sex couples who wished to marry under tribal
law. Id.
137 Id. at 21; Gunn, supra note 135, at 322.
13' Literature treating Lara discusses two potential limits on the congressional delegation
exception. First, many commentators speculate that political processes will prevent tribes
from making use of the exception. This paragraph discusses this first, most common
argument. Second, some writers note that comments made by the Court indicate that
the Court may think the exception has external limits. For discussion of this argument,
see discussion infra Part IV.C. (Court's dicta implies that Constitution may limit use of
congressional delegation exception).
133
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is the political process itself' 39 Many commentators suggest that Congress lacks
the "political will" to enlarge jurisdiction, except under limited circumstances
like those that led to the "Duro fix."' One author opines that Congress actually
would be hostile to the idea: "there remains a core of ill will toward Indian nations
and sovereignty in both congressional houses.' ' 4 1 Another practical problem is
that tribes, who have suffered under the plenary power doctrine, may not be
willing to use it to their advantage. 142

B. The Lurking Issue: Implicit Divestitureas an UnmooredDoctrine
As summarized above, most of the commentary regarding Lara focuses
on discussing the "Duro fix" as an application of the congressional delegation
exception and postulating further applications this exception may have in Indian
Country.143 Commentators see congressional delegation as a means by which
Congress can reverse the Court's implicit divestiture holdings 144 and as a way it
1 45
can enlarge the tribes' authority while proactively preventing legal challenges.
Under this reading, the major obstacle to using the congressional delegation
exception to vindicate tribal sovereignty is the practical problem of convincing

Congress and the tribes to do

SO.

146

However promising Lara's acceptance of the congressional delegation exception may be, the most important aspect of the Lara decision is what it revealed
about implicit divestiture: currently, the doctrine lacks a consistent rationale. In
fact, the rationale the Lara Court offers for implicit divesture differs significantly
from that which it set out in Oliphant.The Lara Court does not acknowledge this
discrepancy, but it could prove problematic. Theoretical inconsistency may indicate that implicit divestiture doctrine is a moving target. Lara may not, after all,
See, e.g., Gould, supra note 136, at 21; Gunn, supra note 135, at 322-324; Tabor, supra
note 133, at 401; Fletcher, supra note 133, at 802; Christopher J. Schneider, Hornell
Brewing Co. v. Rosebud Sioux Tribal Court: Denigratingthe Spirit of Crazyhorse to Restrain
the Scope of Tribal CourtJurisdiction,43 S.D. L. REv. 486, 525 (1998) (written prior to
Lara).
140 See Gould, supra note 136, at 21; Gunn, supranote 135, at 322-323; Tabor, supra note
133, at 401; Fletcher, supra note 133, at 802.
141See Schneider, supra note 139, at 525.
142 Gunn, supra note 135, at 324.
143 Supra Part V.A.
144See supra note 136.
145 See Gould, supra note 136, at 21 ("Lara makes clear that the Court must step aside
when Congress legislates respecting [tribal jurisdiction]"). See also Tabor, supra note
133, at 399; Fletcher, supra note 133, at 800-03; Radon, supra note 134, at 1301-02.
Discussion in these authorities implies that congressional legislation is a solution immune
from subsequent legal challenge.
146 See, e.g., Gould, supra note 136, at 21; Tabor, supra note 133, at 401; Fletcher, supra
note 133 at 802.
139
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provide the definitive statement of implicit divestiture's scope and consequences.
If it does not, Lara's usefulness for Indian Country may be more limited than
current literature suggests.
The Lara opinion appears to set out a rationale for implicit divestiture:
[The "Duro fix"] relaxes the restrictions, recognized in Duro,
that the political branches had imposed on the tribes' exercise
of inherent prosecutorial power.... [Holdings finding implicit
divestiture] reflect the Court's view of the tribes' retained sover47
eign status as ofthe time the Court made them.
Although, practically speaking, the limits imposed on tribal jurisdiction under
Duro stemmed from the Court's Duro decision, the Lara Court implied that these
limits instead originated from legislative and executive acts. 148 According to the
Court's explanation, Duro merely effectuated limits that the otherfederal branches
had imposed on tribal authority.1 49 This analysis informs the Court's broader
comment about its implicit divestiture holdings: that each holding reflected its
view of the tribes' authority as of the time the Court made it. 15' According to
Lara, the Court's divestiture rulings result from its reasoning that another federal
branch previously had curtailed tribal authority. 51
Essentially, then, Lara situates implicit divestiture doctrine as a gap-filler.
In cases where a law's application in Indian Country is at issue but the law's
text leaves that issue unresolved, the Court presumes that Congress enacted the
law without considering it.' 52 To settle the dispute, the Court tries to infer how
Congress would have wanted the law to work, and uses implicit divestiture to
effectuate what it considers Congress would have intended. 153 Thus, the Lara
Court's comments recast implicit divestiture doctrine as a means by which the
Court effectuates Congress' un- or imperfectly-expressed intent to limit tribal
jurisdiction.

147 United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200, 205 (2004).

See id. at 200.
id.
150 Id. at 205.
151 See id.
152 See id.
'53 See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 205 (2004). Cf Frickey, supra note 98, at
458. Writing post-Lara, Frickey summarizes Oliphants result using Lara's rationale: "the
Court in Oliphant stepped into what it must have perceived as a legal void and 'fixed'
the problem." Id. Frickey rightly criticizes implicit divestiture doctrine on the basis that,
"under foundational Indian law, things Congress has not done to diminish tribal authority
are not voids-they are areas of retained tribal authority." Id.
148

149 See
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In Oliphant,however, the Court offered a different rationale. 54 After announcing implicit divestiture's rule that "Indian tribes are prohibited from exercising
both those [sovereign] powers ... that are expressly terminated by Congress and
those powers 'inconsistent with their status[,]"'' 155 the Court went on to explain:
We have already described some of the inherent limitations
on tribal powers that stem from [tribes'] incorporation into
the United States. In Johnson v. Mntosh. . . we noted that the
Indian tribes' "power to dispose of the soil at their own will, to
whomsoever they pleased," was inherently lost to the overriding sovereignty of the United States. And in Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia... the Chief Justice observed that since Indian tribes are
"completely under the sovereignty and dominion of the United
States, ....
any attempt [by foreign nations] to acquire their lands,
or to form a political connexion with them, would be considered
by all as an invasion of our territory, and an act of hostility."
Nor are the intrinsic limitations on Indian tribal authority
restricted to limitations on the tribes' power to transfer lands or
15 6
exercise external political sovereignty.
Here, the Court said that the tribes' "incorporation into the United States"
limited their powers.1 57 The Court also held that limitations on tribal sovereignty
"stem" from this incorporation.' 58 Finally, the Court added that the limitations
on tribal sovereignty that it had mentioned-presumably, those that "stem" from
"incorporation"-are not exclusive. 59
Since Oliphant situates "incorporation" at the heart of implicit divestiture
doctrine, 161 it becomes vital to understand it. The Court's examples of "inherent
limitations" on tribal powers resulting from incorporation 61-that tribes are
unable to alienate land and to exercise external political sovereignty-indicate
that the Court is using "incorporation" to describe the limitations imposed upon
tribes under the doctrine of discovery. As discussed in Part II, Johnson stands for
the propositions that discovery stripped tribes of the ability to convey their land
freely, and also of the authority to have government-to-government relations with

Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 208-09 (1978).
55Id. at 208.
156Id. at 209 (citations omitted) (deciding that Indian tribes' "dependent status" implicitly
04

divested them of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians).
157Id.
158

Id.

59d.
See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 209 (1978).
161 Id.
160
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anyone but their discoverer. In Oliphant, the Court cited these dispossessions as
examples of limitations that resulted from the tribes' incorporation.162 The limitations that, in Johnson, the Court held to result from discovery, 63 it described in
Oliphantas resulting from "incorporation."' '
By equating the consequences of discovery with those of incorporation, it
seems the OliphantCourt is saying that discovery is the event which divested the
tribes of authority "inconsistent with their status."165 Under Oliphant'sreasoning,
the Court's implicit divestiture holdings are consequences of discovery: just as
discovery divested the tribes of the right to alienate land (Johnson), it also divested
tribes of the rights to criminally prosecute non-Indians (Oliphant), to criminally
prosecute nonmember Indians (Duro), and so on. The Court's conflation thus
has the effect of broadening Johnson's doctrine of discovery. 166 Discovery's effects
are not limited to Johnson's prior holdings; rather, discovery carries additional
consequences enumerated in the Court's implicit divestiture jurisprudence.
Comparing the Lara and Oliphant implicit divestiture rationales side by
side highlights the points at which the two paradigms diverge. These theoretical
differences reflect models of implicit divestiture that are significantly different
and potentially incompatible. Because the rationale the Court ultimately chooses
will have dramatic repercussions upon the scope of authority it allows tribes to
exercise, it is important to examine the differences between the two rationales and
the consequences of each.
The first point of difference between the two rationales is what each identifies as the source of limits on tribal sovereignty. Lara identified Congress as the
source of these limits: Congress' plenary power over tribes allows it unilaterally
to restrict tribal authority.167 Under this model, Congress divests tribes of specific
sovereign powers piecemeal, by various congressional acts that either deal directly
with or that indirectly affect Indian Country.168 By contrast, Oliphant's reason-

Oliphant,435 U.S. at 209.
Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 573 (1823).
164Oliphant,435 U.S. at 209.
165 Id. at 208.
166 See id.(stating that intrinsic limitations on tribal authority imposed by incorporation
162
163

are not "restricted to limitations on the tribes' power to transfer lands or exercise external
political sovereignty").
167 United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 202 (2004) ("Congress, with this Court's approval,
has interpreted this Constitution's 'plenary' grants of power as authorizing it to enact
legislation that ... restricts ... tribal sovereign authority.").
168 See id.
The Court gave examples of legislative acts representing Congress' changing
policy towards the tribes, and concludes that such policy changes "inevitably involve major
changes in the metes and bounds of tribal sovereignty." Id. The Court then described
its Oliphant and Duro implicit divestiture holdings as resting upon historical sources,
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ing implies that discovery is the sole source of limits upon tribal sovereignty. 169
Under Oliphant,divestiture occurred in one fell swoop at the point of the tribes'
17
discovery, and independently of any congressional exercise of plenary power. 1
In addition, the two decisions cast the Court's role differently. In Lara,
implicit divestiture is the means by which the Court attempts to consummate
congressional intent. 17 1 Congress' acts impose limits on tribes' authority; the
Court discerns and enforces these limits, using the doctrine of implicit divestiture
to invalidate exercises of tribal authority that exceed them. 172 Thus, under Lara,
congressional intent circumscribes the Court's role. 173 Since implicit divestiture
is merely a means of effectuating congressional intent, any ruling refuted by
Congress would override the decision by showing that the Court had failed cor74
rectly to discern and implement Congress' intent.
In Oliphant, however, divestiture automatically resulted from the tribes'
discovery, and the implicit divestiture doctrine is the Court's way of enforcing the
limits it considers to result from discovery. 175 Because the Court alone determines
what limits discovery imposes upon tribal sovereignty, 176 this model gives the
Court unlimited latitude itself to determine the bounds of tribal authority.
The Lara Court's opinion does not acknowledge that its rationale for implicit
divestiture differs from Oliphant's.177 The fact that Lara's majority disregarded this
disparity should give pause to those who see Lara as a way of overruling implicit

including congressional legislation, and concludes that "Wheeler, Oliphant,and Duro...
are not determinative because Congress has enacted a new statute, relaxing restrictions on
the bounds of.. . inherent tribal authority .... And that fact makes all the difference."
Id. at 205-07.
169 See Oliphant,435 U.S. at 208-09.
170 See id. at 209. The Court says that "incorporation into the territory of the United
States" constrains the tribes' exercise of separate powers "so as not to conflict with" the
interests of the United States' "overriding sovereignty." Id. The examples the Court gives
of "inherent limitations" that "stem from" incorporation include the tribes' inability unilaterally to alienate the lands they occupy and the inability to have external relationships
with other nations. Id.
'I' See Lara, 541 U.S. at 205-07 (describing Wheeler, Oliphant,and Duro as "reflect[ing]
the Court's view of the tribes' retained sovereign status as of the time the Court made [the
decisions]" and describing limitations on tribal authority as "restrictions imposed by the
political branches") (emphasis added).
172 See id.
173 See id.
174 See

id.

17 See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 208-09 (1978).
176 See id. at 209.
177 See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004).
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divestiture. 78 The asymmetries are troubling because they cause different results
regarding the Court's authority to invalidate tribal actions via implicit divestiture
doctrine and also Congress' role in setting the bounds of tribal authority. 7' A
skeptic might say that having two concurrent implicit divestiture rationales gives
the Court latitude to cite to whichever one allows it to reach its desired result.
At the very least, it leaves open the possibility that the Court might find that
discovery divested the tribes of the sovereignty necessary for some assertions of
jurisdiction.

C. ConstitutionalLimits on the CongressionalDelegationException?
An Illustrationof the Problems ofan UnmooredDoctrine
A few commentators 8 ° have discussed a conundrum contained in the
Lara decision that may illustrate the problems caused by vagaries in implicit
divestiture's rationale. The Court's comments in Lara and other cases indicate
that it may consider tribal authority somehow to be circumscribed by the United
States Constitution. Steven J. Gunn draws upon various Court opinions to offer
a succinct overview of the Court's concerns:
The Lara Court mentioned, but did not "consider," the question
of "whether the Constitution's Due Process or Equal Protection
Clauses prohibit tribes from prosecuting a nonmember citizen
of the United States." Thus, while the Court held that Congress
possesses the "constitutional power to enact a statute that modiBut cf Alex Tallchief Skibine, Redefining the Status of Indian Tribes Within "Our
Federalism' Beyond the Dependency Paradigm,38 CONN. L. REv. 667, 679 (2006). Skibine
argues that Lara narrows the scope of implicit divestiture doctrine and premises this argument upon his belief that Lara's majority opinion repeals parts of Oliphant's implicit
divestiture rationale. Id. Skibine later posits, however, that the congressional delegation
exception nonetheless may be limited. He suggests that the Court's recent decisions
"could be construed" as defining Congress' plenary power over "Indian affairs" narrowly,
to exclude any matter that implicates state interests. Id. at 683 ("While the Court repeatedly insists that Congress has plenary authority over Indian affairs, recent cases could
be construed as indicating that the Court might consider regulation of non-Indians on
Indian reservations as not always involving such 'Indian affairs' over which Congress has
plenary power."). If so, the congressional delegation exception would be available only in
matters that involved Indian interests exclusively.
179 Under Oliphant's rationale, the Court retains ultimate authority to hold that discovery/incorporation divested the tribes of authority by finding that the asserted authority
is inconsistent with the interests of the United States. See Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 209.
Under Lara, implicit divestiture is merely a means of effectuating Congress' changing
policy towards the tribes. See Lara, 541 U.S. at 205. Thus, Lara allows Congress to set the
bounds of tribal authority, while Oliphantdoes not.
180 Gunn, supra note 135, at 318-19; cf Radon, supra note 134, at 1306-09 (stating
that a "dominant society" is concerned that tribal courts will not protect individual's
178
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fies tribal power," it did not decide whether the Duro fix itself
ran afoul of the Constitution by permitting tribes to prosecute
nonmember Indian citizens without affording them "certain
constitutional safeguards."...
[T]he Court has stated that it would be "inconsistent with the
overriding interests of the National Government" to permit
Indian tribes to prosecute non-tribal members in "tribal courts
which do not accord the full protections of the Bill of Rights."
The Court has long held that the Bill of Rights does not apply
to Indian tribal governments, and while the Indian Civil Rights
Act ... imposes on tribal governments "some guarantees of fair

procedure," it does not incorporate all of the protections under
the Bill of Rights. For example.... ICRA contains no guarantee
of court appointed counsel for indigent criminal defendants.
In light of this and other limitations, the Court has suggested
that there may be "constitutional limitations" on the ability of
Congress, "through recognition of inherent tribal authority" or
otherwise, to "subject American citizens to criminal proceedings
before a tribunal that does not provide constitutional protections
as a matter of right."

As for the Equal Protection Clause, the Court has suggested that
congressional authorization of tribal power over nonmember
Indians, but not over non-Indians, may raise equal protection
181
concerns.
As Gunn's synopsis makes clear, the Court consistently has hinted that tribal
criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers may be subject to constitutional limits.
Specifically, the Court speculates that, depending on how Congress structured
its delegation, tribal jurisdiction could run afoul of the Due Process and Equal
Protection clauses.
Though Gunn's analysis 182 focuses on possible constitutional limits regarding
tribal criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers, it seems likely the Court also might
find the Constitution imposes limits on other kinds of jurisdiction-including
rights and liberties); Gould, supra note 136, at 21 (saying that the Court "sidestepp[ed]"
constitutional concerns and characterizing this circumvention as "a major downside" of
the decision).
181Gunn, supra note 135, at 318-19 (citations omitted). In addition to Lara, 541 U.S.
193, Gunn quotes and cites Wash. v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation,
447 U.S. 134 (1980), and Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990).
182 Id.
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civil adjudicative jurisdiction and legislative jurisdiction. Constitutional concerns
would seem to apply equally to these areas: any exercise of tribal jurisdiction
potentially could subject American citizens to action that would be unconstitutional if taken by the federal, state, or municipal governments.
The Court's comments nonetheless are difficult to explain doctrinally, because
the Court's jurisprudence expressly holds that tribal authority does not arise from
the Constitution and thus is not limited by the constraints the Constitution
imposes upon the federal powers it created. 8 3 Philip P. Frickey addresses the problems inherent in the Court's constitutional arguments through a critique of Justice
Kennedy's Lara concurrence, which was based upon constitutional concerns:
For Justice Kennedy, the Constitution "is based on a theory of
original, and continuing, consent of the governed." The people
condition this consent, he reasoned, upon a federal structure that
limits the powers of both the national and state governments.
Justice Kennedy suggested that Congress' authorization of tribal
prosecutions violates the constitutional structure, for it allows
an American citizen to be tried within the United States by a
government to which that person has not granted the consent of
the governed....
"The original, and continuing, consent of the governed" is a
strange idea [to apply to tribal governments]. Just when and
how did all the Indian tribes become part of the constitutional
system? The answer from constitutional text is never .... Justice
Kennedy's argument reduces to this remarkable contention:
tribes may be judicially subjugated based on the mystical implications of a document by which they have never consented to be
bound and to which they have never even been coercively tied
• . . because the document is manifestly good. The argument
is driven by an almost irresistible impulse of coherence flowing
from the canonical place of the Constitution in our legal culture
and the related instinct that all exercises of governmental power
must somehow be subject to it. 84
As seen in Gunn's synopsis, 18 5 the Court consistently has indicated that tribal
governments might be subject to constitutional limits. Although the Court has
not recently confronted a direct challenge to tribal action based on constitutional
83

' Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 383 (1896).
Frickey, supra note 98, at 465, 468. Frickey uses Kennedy's concurrence to address the
Court's constitutional concerns because Lara's majority found that Lards Double Jeopardy
claim did not raise the constitutional issues squarely, and thus eschewed discussing them.
See Lara, 541 U.S. at 209.
185 See supra text accompanying note 181.
184
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concerns, Frickey'8 6 correctly notes the problem with a constitutional argument:
doctrinally, tribes are not subject to the Constitution. 8 7 In order to contend
otherwise, the Court seemingly would have to identify a point at which tribal
action became subject to the Constitution.'88
Frickey suggests that the Court cannot identify this point because it does
not exist.' 89 Instead, says Frickey, Justice Kennedy resorts to a legal fiction: the
"consent of the governed" argument. 190 Under this argument, the citizenry's
consent to be governed by the United States is based upon its understanding that
the government action to which it is subject is limited by the Constitution.' 9'
Therefore, any federal action subjecting a citizen to a tribal government would
be invalid, because it subjects the citizenry to a government not limited by the
Constitution. 192 The federal action granting the tribe jurisdiction would exceed
the reign the citizenry allowed the federal government. 193
Frickey argues that the "consent of the governed" argument is a "seduction"
which "requires resisting."'1 94 Certainly it bodes ill for tribes. Assuming the argument is merely a "seduction,"' 95 however, the rationale for applying constitutional
186

Frickey, supra note 98, at 467-68.

187 See Talton, 163 U.S. at 376.
188

Frickey also comes to this conclusion. See supra note 98, at 466-67.

189 Frickey, supra note 98, at 466-67. Frickey assumes that Kennedy's argument is that

the Constitution's text renders tribes subject to it and criticizes Kennedy's opinion on the
basis that it "applie[s] the doctrine of'it-must-be-somewhere[.]"' Id. Frickey's analysis is

problematic if Kennedy's rationale does not in fact rest on constitutional text, but instead
upon the doctrine of discovery (as argued in this Article).
190 Frickey, supra note 98, at 465-66.
191See

id. at 465 ("The people condition [their consent to be governed, Kennedy] rea-

soned, upon a federal structure that limits the powers of both the national and state

governments.").
192 See id. at 466 ("Justice Kennedy suggested that [the Duro fix's] authorization of tribal
prosecution violates the constitutional structure, for it allows the American citizen to be

tried within the United States by a government to which that person has not granted the
consent of the governed."). This statement assumes that the federal grant of jurisdiction
was not conditioned upon the tribe's being bound by constitutional mandates. Presumably,
if a grant of jurisdiction to the tribe met constitutional muster, the grant would be within
the scope of the citizenry's consent to the federal government and therefore would be
valid.
193See id.
'9'Id.at 468.
195 Id. This assertion is arguable. The "consent of the governed" rationale may have a basis
in the Tenth Amendment, which reserves powers not delegated to the United States "to
the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend X. One could argue that the
people had not delegated the United States the power to subject them to governments that
did not comport with the Constitution; under the Tenth Amendment, then, the United
States would lack the power to compel U.S. citizens to be subject to tribal jurisdiction.
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principles to the tribes would be a legal fiction, susceptible to attack as sleight
of hand. However, Kennedy's "consent of the governed" rationale may not be
the only rationale supporting the argument that the Constitution limits exercises
of tribal authority. The Court's implicit divestiture jurisprudence may provide
another, intractable rationale: the doctrine of discovery.
Specifically, the Court could cite Oliphant's implicit divestiture rationale1 96
to find that discovery divested the tribes of the ability to exercise sovereignty
in a way inconsistent with the Constitution. 197 This reasoning would establish
the Constitution as a constraint on tribal assertions of jurisdiction and would
explain the Court's cryptic warnings198 that tribes may be subject to constitutional
limitations.
If the Court follows this course, its decisions ultimately will clarify that
Oliphant's implicit divestiture rationale199 remains viable post-Lara, and that
discovery still functions as a source of power, independent of and concurrent
with that described in Lara,2 °° by which the Court can divest tribes of authority.
If Oliphant's rationale °1 remains valid, the Court retains authority to define what
types of tribal authority are "inconsistent" with the tribes' status, as well as to strip
tribes of power under the implicit divestiture doctrine.20 2 Moreover, if the Court

196 Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 208-09 (1978) (noting that the
tribes' "incorporation" into the United States "constrained" tribal sovereignty as not to
conflict with the interests of the United States). The Oliphant Court characterizes assertions of sovereignty that are inconsistent with United States' interests as "inconsistent"
with the tribes' statuses. Id. at 208. Under Oliphant's implicit divestiture doctrine, the
Court invalidates assertions of tribal authority it finds to conflict with the United States'

interests. See id. See also discussion supra Part IV.B.
197 The Court could find that congressional acts are not the only measure of the United
States' interests, and could hold that the United States has an interest in constitutional
principles which overrides congressional ratifications of tribal authority that would allow
tribes to act in a manner inconsistent with the Constitution.
198 Eg., Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S.
134, at 153-154 (1980) (it would be "inconsistent with the overriding interests of the
National Government" to permit tribal courts to prosecute nonmembers without the
full protections of the Bill of Rights); Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 693 (1990) (Court
"hesitate[s]" to adopt a view of tribal sovereignty that allows nonmembers to be tried by
tribal governments "that do not include them").
199 See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
200 Lara identifies congressional acts as a source by which tribes can be divested of power

and describes implicit divestiture as a means by which the Court effectuates limitations
on tribal power which Congress intended but did not expressly enact. See discussion supra
Part IV.B.
201 See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
202 See discussion supra Part IV.B.
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holds that discovery can accomplish divestiture absent congressional action, the
congressional delegation exception might not be an available means for Congress
to override a Court decision that relies upon it. If Oliphant and Lara represent
concurrent sources of authority for implicit divestiture, the Court has latitude
to limit the congressional delegation exception's availability to Lara's congressionally-driven, plenary power rationale.
The confusion surrounding implicit divestiture's rationale-or rationalesmakes the doctrine unmoored and malleable. Ultimately, it may call Lara's utility
into question, because the implicit divestiture rationale the Court adopts may
delineate the bounds of authority that Congress can restore to the tribes. Unless
the Court clarifies that the doctrine of discovery does not underpin implicit
divestiture, the Court nonetheless may invalidate exercises of tribal sovereignty
expressly sanctioned by Congress. This result would remove much of the power of
the congressional delegation exception by situating the Court as the final arbiter
of tribal sovereignty.
V. CONCLUSION

From the beginning of its jurisprudence, the Supreme Court's holdings
have ratified the federal government's encroachment upon Indian lands and
sovereignty. 0 3 The doctrines of discovery and plenary power provide dramatic
examples of the way the Court has developed doctrines that vindicate the United
States' interests at the tribes' expense.0 4
Implicit divestiture undoubtedly is another such doctrine, but its characteristics distinguish it from its predecessors. Unlike the doctrine of plenary power,
implicit divestiture is judicially-driven. 20 5 Moreover, unlike either discovery
or plenary power, implicit divestiture's reach as yet is undefined. 20 6 Under the
doctrine, the Court potentially wields significant power to invalidate exercises of
20 7
tribal authority.
At first blush, Lara appears to provide a welcome means for Congress to
overrule the Court's implicit divestiture holdings, and even act preemptively on
the tribes' behalf, using the legislative process to ensure that tribes can effectively
govern and manage Indian Country.2 8 On closer inspection, however, the

See, e.g., Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823) (holding that discovery
necessarily diminished tribes' rights to complete sovereignty and their rights to alienate
land), discussed supra Part II.A.
204 See discussion supra Part II.
205 See discussion supra Part III.A.
206 Id.
207 Id.
208 See discussion supra Parts III.B, IV.A.
203
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congressional delegation exception may be less promising than it appears. The
Court continues to speculate that congressional delegation might be subject to
external limits, 20 9 and, in Lara, practically invites parties to challenge the Duro fix
on constitutional grounds." Meanwhile, its Oliphantrationale-the doctrine of
discovery in disguise-continues to lurk in the background. 21'
Given these factors, the congressional delegation exception likely is not the
panacea for implicit divestiture. Indeed, although constitutional concerns may
provide a starting point for the Court to re-examine the validity of exercises of tribal
sovereignty, they are not necessarily its terminus. The Court might go beyond the
constitutional concerns already raised to find that discovery implicitly divested
the tribes of the ability to exercise sovereignty in any way inconsistent with the
Constitution.212 Ironically, Lara-a decision hailed by many as a triumph for
tribal sovereignty 2 13-may serve as the starting point for limits upon sovereignty
that are more stringent, not less.

Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 693 (1990); see United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193,
207-10 (2004).
210 541 U.S. at 209 ("Other defendants in tribal proceedings remain free to raise [a constitutional claim] should they wish to do so. See 25 U.S.C. §1303 (vesting district courts
with jurisdiction over habeas writs from tribal courts).").
209

211

See discussion supra Part IMB.

Until now, the Court's comments regarding non-congressional limits on tribal sovereignty have focused around its concerns about the constitutionality of allowing tribes
to criminally prosecute nonmembers and non-Indians. See cases cited supra note 189.
However, if Oliphant's criteria for implicit divestiture is viable post-Lara, then tribes
may not be able to exercise inherent tribal authority-whether or not congressionally
ratified-that the Court considers "to conflict with the interests of [the United States']
overriding sovereignty." Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 209 (1978).
Under Oliphant, the test is not constitutionality, but the United States' interests. Id.
Congressional delegations of tribal authority that would not be unconstitutional might
still run afoul of Oliphant's broad national interests standard.
213 E.g., Bethany R. Berger, United States v. Lara as a Story ofNative Agency, 40 TULSA L.
REv. 5 (2004).
212
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